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Abstract
This paper characterizes the equilibria of infrastructure franchising un-
der incomplete contracting and ex-post renegotiation. The parties (gov-
ernment and a …rm) are unable to credibly commit to the contracted in-
vestment plan, so that a second step investment (labeled as investments
in service quality) is renegotiated by the parties in the revision stage. As
expected, the possibility of renegotiation a¤ects initial non-veri…able invest-
ments. The main conclusion of this paper is that not only under-investment
but also over-investment in infrastructure may arise in equilibrium, com-
pared to the complete contracting level.
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In the 1980’s and 90’s, both developed and developing countries started a rapid
process of privatization of public enterprises. The main reason to justify the pri-
vatization process has been to improve e¢ciency and pursue sustained long-run
growth. Privatization and e¢ciency are more easily achieved in principle in sec-
tors with no natural monopoly characteristics. However, sectors such as utilities
(e.g. electricity, telecommunications) and public infrastructure (e.g. highways,
ports) show important economies of scale and scope. Thus, at least in such cases,
privatization and e¢ciency are not necessarily directly related. The experience of
developing countries shows that important pre-conditions are not satis…ed which
will ensure the bene…t of privatizing …rms operating in markets with natural
monopoly characteristics. Then, a long process that creates the necessary condi-
tions to privatize …rms in these sectors should be previously carried out.1
It is interesting to know how important e¢ciency problems could become when
activities with natural monopoly characteristics are privatized. This paper uses
contract theory asaway tounderstand the e¢ciency consequences of renegotiation
in the context of public infrastructure franchising, which is of great importance in
developing countries today. There are two theoretical ways to study contracting
problems arising when opportunistic parties want to renegotiate their original
contract. One way is to assume asymmetric information and the other is to
assume symmetric but unveri…able information. In this paper we follow the second
approach.2
The main contribution of this paper to the literature in incomplete contracting
with symmetric but unveri…able information is the possibility of over-investment
in public infrastructure; i.e. “white elephants” are therefore not only consequence
of public production but also they may arise under private provision of public
infrastructure. Over-investment is not new, however, in the new regulatory eco-
nomics. Tirole (1986) and Besanko and Spulber (1992) have already found that
possibility in an asymmetric information setting.
From the public policy perspective, this paper illustrates the importance of
1A general discussion about pros and cons of regulation can be obtained in Khan (1988),
Tirole (1988), Vickers and Yarrow (1988), and Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994). To see
the experience on privatization and the posterior regulation of utilities in developing countries,
see Mu´ noz (1993) and Bitran and Saavedra (1993).
2Mandatory references on this topic are Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1988),
Bolton (1990), Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), and Noldeke and Schmidt
(1995).
2reducing ambiguities (contract incompleteness) in infrastructure franchising. The
more ambiguities in contracts, the more likely to departs from optimal alloca-
tions of resources. Furthermore, this paper also highlights the importance of
strengthening regulatory and judiciary institutions in order to avoid both exces-
sive ambiguities and opportunistic behavior. The worse prepared institutions in
the country, the more likely to end up with either the hold-up problem or with
“white elephants” in infrastructure.
A large number of papers has been written during the last two decades regard-
ing the regulation of natural monopolies and procurement3. Most of the research
uses principal-agent models to discuss the government and the monopolist inter-
action. This literature, however, has minimized the role of incomplete contracts.
Contractual incompleteness is particularly useful when studying developing coun-
tries, where the regulatory framework is normally ambiguous and both regulatory
and judiciary institutions are technically bad prepared to do their duties. Hence,
it is fair to assume either the existence of transaction costs or bounded rational-
ity that impede the government to write a complete (contingent) contract before
initial investments are ful…lled4. Whatever the explanation to contractual incom-
pleteness is, the parties have to deal with opportunistic behavior arising as a
consequence of the non-contracted contingencies.
This paper considers a modi…ed version of the canonical model by Hart and
Moore (1988) on symmetric but unveri…able information. They study a procure-
ment relationship between two private parties under incomplete contracting and
renegotiation of the price of the good. The main conclusion their paper is the
hold-up e¤ect, i.e., the …rm under-invests in infrastructure as compared with the
complete contracting situation. Thus, both parties would be better-o¤ if they
were able to credibly commit not to renegotiate after sunk investments have been
carried out. Other conclusions pertinent to our paper are the following: when
the time zero contract is revised, the ex-post surplus is fully appropriated by the
party who has more power in the renegotiation game; disputes are not an equi-
librium outcome because of the non-veri…ability of the initial investments; the
parties are severely constrained when setting the price of the good in the original
3Let me only mention La¤ont and Tirole (1993), which contains most of the topics in this
area and a large number of references to the relevant literature.
4Transactions costs and bounded rationality are the two more widely accepted explanations
for the existence of incomplete contracts in practice; see for instance Williamsom (1975) and
(1985), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1977), Hart and Holmström (1987). More formal justi…ca-
tions to contractual incompleteness are found in Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Spier (1992),
Allen and Gale (1992), Anderlini and Felli (1994), and Bernheim and Whinston (1996).
3contract; and when only one party’s sunk investment matters, optimal (…rst best)
investment levels can be achieved.
Despite being intuitive, the hold-up e¤ect is not robust to changes on basic
assumptions of the model. Two important examples are provided by Aghion, et.
al. (1994) and Noldeke and Schmidt (1995)5. The main problem with those papers
is that they assume courts observe more than they typically observe in practice (at
least in developing countries). It is precisely the weakness of the judiciary system
in developing countries our main argument to justify why we consider Hart and
Moore’s setting better suitable to analyze infrastructure franchising in developing
countries.
We introduce two main changes to Hart and Moore’s: (i) a benevolent govern-
ment is one of the parties in the relationship; and (ii) the variable to be revised
in the renegotiation stage is investment in quality, instead of price. Contrary
to standard literature, the main conclusions in this paper are that both under-
investment and over-investment are feasible subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
outcomes; in the case of renegotiation, the ex-post surplus might be shared by
the two parties; legal disputes are irrelevant; the government has total freedom
to choose its optimal contract at time zero; and the …rst best investment levels
(I¤;q¤) cannot be achieved even when only the …rm’s investment matters.
The model is presented in the next section. Section 3 solves the renegotiation
game played by the government and the …rm after the investment in infrastructure
have been sunk and the parties observe the actual state of nature. This section
contains one proposition that characterizes the renegotiation process. Section 4
presents a solution for the model. Two propositions respectively characterize the
…rm’s investment decision and the optimal time-zero contract. Finally, section 5
concludes.
5The implementation theory tells us that e¢cient investments are attained if the parties are
able to design the revision stage in the original contract (e.g. Aghion, et. al. (1994) and Maskin
and Tirole (1997)). One problem with the renegotiation design approach is that contracts
should be much more sophisticated than they are in practice. For example, when using the
revelation principle to obtain e¢cient investments, Aghion, et. al. assume courts must observe
probabilities of trading when quantity is a discrete variable (let say, trade or not trade). Clearly,
this is a strong assumption regarding capabilities of judges in practice. Another approach solving
the hold-up e¤ect is to assume courts may observe delivery of the good (Noldeke and Schmidt,
(1995)). With this very small departure from Hart and Moore’s model, the parties are able to
implement the …rst best writing simple option contracts which give the seller the right to deliver
and specify payments contingent on whether delivery takes place. Noldeke and Schmidt assume
courts may distinguish whether the seller is stopping delivery on its own rather than by the
buyer’s pressure.
42. The Model
Let us …rst state what we understand for regulated public infrastructure in this
paper. They are ports and airports, highways, tunnels, subways, etc. whose
common feature is that all of them have both natural monopoly (high sunk in-
vestment levels implying decreasing average costs) and public good characteristics
(non-rivalry in consumption). Franchising allow the private sector to participate
in …nancing and operating these facilities, but it also gives monopolistic power to
the …rm. In the more typical infrastructure franchising design, the government
gives to a private …rm the right to build and, later on, operate the facility for a
limited number of years. A contract signed when the project is granted regulates
both how the facility has to be built (e.g. the level of quality) and how the op-
eration has to be done (e.g. the vector of prices to be charged to users of the
facility)6.
Accordingly, consider an economy where the government decides to privatize
the construction of infrastructure. Due to scale economies, it is socially preferred
to have only one …rm for each project. A bidding process for each project decides
what investor obtains the franchise to build and operate the facility by some
speci…ed number of years (T periods). Assume that the economic value of the
project and assets are zero for both parties after T. Finally, assume that if the
project is aborted in the renegotiation stage, then its economic value is zero for
each party and no payments are done as compensation for such a decision.
Since the government behaves strategically, it will commit not to renegotiate
veri…able variables (e.g. prices) if and only if such a commitment is credible to
the other party. In the real world, the government may set itself high barriers
to change contracted prices, especially in public infrastructure franchising and
procurement relationships7. Accordingly, our model assumes contracted prices
are …xed in the original contract and not ex-post revised. Furthermore, let us
suppose, without further lost of generality, that the demand for using this facility
is deterministic and common knowledge. Therefore, the present value of the
6We indistinctly named to this contract as “original contract”, “date-zero contract”, or “old
contract”.
7As a matter of fact, the Chilean government …xes cap prices in real terms (i.e., indexed by
in‡ation) prior to the bidding process. Thus, any renegotiation on those prices is extremely
costly because two potential groups of presion –consumers and those …rms that did not get the
project– become natural watchdogs of the original contract. Furthermore, our assumption also
has theoretical support. Bös and Lülfesmann (1996) show that the …rst best is attained when a
benevolent government is the buyer in the Hart and Moore’s model.
5revenue for the …rm, R, is also deterministic and common knowledge.8
This does not mean, however, that the incomplete contracts problem has been
solved in the real world. We usually observe …rms and regulators renegotiating
other variables that cannot be contracted and that do not have natural watch-
dogs, such as side payments and the contracted investment plan. When beginning
an infrastructure project, …rms confront a big amount of uncertainty in most of
the relevant variables, uncertainty which mostly disappear in …nal stages of the
construction process. Accordingly, let us assume that the parties do not know the
true state of the world, !, at time zero; they learn ! at period 1. Moreover, sup-
pose that to write a complete contingent and enforceable contract is prohibitively
costly because the true ! is su¢ciently complex and of high dimension. For sim-
plicity, assume that ! 2 - , a …nite set. The support of - is common knowledge.
As we will see soon, ! a¤ects both the consumer surplus and the operational costs
of the project.
We assume two steps of investments. An initial investment (I 2 [IL;IH]),
which cannot be contracted upon because it represents unveri…able investment ef-
fort decisions9. The …rm commits to undertake speci…c investments in infrastruc-
ture before period 1, when the uncertainty regarding the true state of the world is
still present. This assumption allows the parties to behave opportunistically after
those investments are sunk.
We also assume a second step investment (labeled as investment in quality
of the service, q) which is undertaken between periods 1 and 2, when all of the
uncertainty has disappeared. Consistent with practice, suppose that q is enforce-
able and, above certain minimum level, non-observable by the users of the facility.
Since quality is not directly observable by outsiders, the government cannot com-
mit not to renegotiate this variable in the future10. Let us assume that this
investment is undertaken in order to produce a workable outcome of the project.
8We are implicitly assuming here that, above certain minimum level, the demand is inelastic
with respect to the quality of the service. This assumption is consistent with the fact that often
the quality of the service is not directly observed by consumers (an example, the quality of the
air in a tunnel). Quality of the service above such minimum level becomes a “credence good”
to users, which a¤ects surplus but not the demand of the service.
9An alternative is to suppose that I cannot be contracted because it is su¢ciently complex,
such that no contract may describe it at a reasonable cost. In order to maintain our results, we
need to re-de…ne the set of all feasible values of I, such that I 2 £, where £ is a non-empty,
compact and bounded set.
10The investment in quality, q, might be veri…able by courts only if at least one of the parties
is willing to do it in an eventual dispute. This assumption avoids a new renegotiation stage in
this game.
6The minimum investment in quality required by the government as acceptable is
qL > 0; hence, under the current contract, the …rm should either invest q ¸ qL or
stop the project. Then, assume that q 2 [qL;qH].
If constructed, the public infrastructure is ready at date 2. From date 2
to T the facility is working and the …rm is going to charge a sequence of prices
exogenously determined at time zero and operating with a service quality speci…ed
by the current contract.
Regarding capabilities of judiciary institutions, we assume that outsiders may
only observe whether or not the public infrastructure is built, but neither the
probability of its successful construction nor delivery from the …rm is observed by
courts. This assumption is made in order to avoid the renegotiation design into
the original contract.
Assume that the government is a benevolent planner, so its problem is to
maximize the expected summation (over !) of the consumer and …rm’s surpluses.
De…ne v as the present value of the net consumer surplus. Assume that v depends
upon the state of nature (!) and the quality of the facility (q), in addition to prices
and demand level. Let c be the present value of operational costs. It depends
upon ! and …rm’s initial investment (I). Finally, Á is a function that transforms
non-monetary costs into monetary costs to the …rm. Regarding functions v;c and
Á, assume:
Assumption 1 [A.1]. For all !:
i) v 2 (vL;vH) if q 2 (qL;qH)
ii) fvq > 0 and vqq < 0g if q 2 (qL;qH)
iii) lim
q!qL
vq = 1; lim
q!qH
vq = 0
Assumption 2 [A.2]. For all !:
i) c = 0 if either the government rejects or the …rm aborts the project.
ii) cI < 0 and cII > 0
iii) lim
I!IL
cI = 1; lim
I!IH
cI = 0







0(x) = 0; lim
x!xH
Á
0(x) = 1 , where x = (I;q)
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee an interior solution to the planner’s problem
(…rst best). Assumption 3 is necessary to obtain unique solutions to the …rm and
the government’s problems, as proved in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2.
7The First Best Outcome. The …rst best is our benchmark. It is the solution
of an omnipotent and benevolent government. Omnipotence in the benchmark
implies the government is able to write a complete contract at date zero. The
government is not omniscient, however, because it is unable to see the “true”
state of nature when writing the contract. Using assumptions 1 to 3 we can
characterize the …rst best, i.e. assuming that speci…c investments can be veri…ed
by outsiders, the …rm and the government will invest levels indicated by the time
zero contract. Suppose all variables are expressed in monetary units at time zero.
The …rst best is the solution to the planner’s problem, that is (I¤ and q¤) solving:
Max
fI;qg
fE! [v(!;q) + R ¡ c(!;I) ¡ Á(I) ¡Á(q)];0g
subject to (I;q)2[IL;IH]-[qL;qH]
The objective function is jointly strictly concave in (I;q). By assumptions
1 to 3, it is also bounded and continuous in both I and q. If evaluated at (I¤;q¤),
the objective function is greater than zero, then there exists a unique solution to
the planner’s problem in the interior of the constrained set.
However, there isn’t an omnipotent government in practice. In general, when
the government and the …rm separately solve their own problems, the …rst best
cannot be achieved because of the impossibility of writing a complete contract
at time zero. Ex-post opportunistic behavior arises because I is not veri…able by
outsiders, neither are realizations of v and c. Thus, incentives to renegotiate arise
because property rights on the ex-post …rm’s surplus (residual surplus) are not
speci…ed by the original contract.
It is important to know when the …rst best investment levels, I¤ and q¤, may
be achieved by the parties. One hypothetical case is when there is no uncertainty,
i.e. for any state of nature, v = v(q) and c = c(I). That is true either because
(a) both …rm and government want and expect to continue with the project, so
the …rm invests optimal levels; or (b) at least one of them wants or expects to
abort the project, thus the …rm does not invest at all. In other words, since all
uncertainty has disappeared the time zero contract can be complete. A second
extreme case when the …rst best may also be attained by the two parties occurs if
both parties want to continue the project at q¤. Hence, setting q = q¤ at time zero
contract the …rm will invest the …rst-best level I¤. That is because the …rm will
continue with the project in any case and it cannot change q¤ with its investment
decision.
8The Second Best Outcome. Conditions to attain the …rst best in the previous
paragraph are, however, rarely satis…ed. To explicitly avoid the second case where
the …rst best would be achieved by the two parties, assume:
Assumption 4 [A.4] Non Renegotiation-Proofness.
For any (I;q) 2 [IL;IH] - [qL;qH]:
i) v(!;q) + R ¡ c(!;I) ¡Á(q) ¸ 0 > v(!0;q) + R ¡ c(!0;I) ¡ Á(q),
for some (!,!0) 2 - ;
ii) R ¡ c(!;I) ¡ Á(q) ¸ 0 > R ¡ c(!0;I) ¡ Á(q), for some (!,!0) 2 -
where v(!;q) + R ¡ c(!;I) ¡ Á(q) and R ¡ c(!;I) ¡ Á(q)
respectively correspond to the government and the …rm’s ex-post
surpluses, for any (I;q) and for a given state of nature !.
Assumption 4 tells us that both parties have ex-ante positive probabilities
of either continuing or aborting the project. Thus, A.4 assumes the contract is
not renegotiation-proof for at least one state of nature. This assumption avoids
settingq small orbig enough to guarantee the…rmthe completeex-post bargaining
surplus, because there exists some ! 2 - such that the government will be willing
to trade. In turn, it implies that even though only the …rm investment decision
matters, the …rst best cannot be implemented. This assumption is feasible as
a consequence of introducing a benevolent government as a party of the game
(buyer) and assuming investment in quality, instead of price, as the only variable
in being revised.11
The extensive form of the complete game between government and …rm after
…nishing the bidding process is showed below (…gure 2.1). As usual, assume
that nature moves …rst. Yet, the true ! is unknown by the two parties until
period one. At time zero (…rst stage) both parties sign the contract that –under
non-enforceability on I– implies to set only the investment in quality, q0 say, to
be carried out after the renegotiation step has …nished (besides other irrelevant
variables to this game, such as prices to be charged to consumers). Let us assume
for a moment that the government sets q0. In the second stage the …rmunilaterally
11Technically, assumption 4 makes sense because fv(q) + R ¡ c ¡ Á(q)g has a maximum on
the interior of [qL;qH]. That is not the case, however, in a procurement model when price is the
variable to be revised because in such a case the buyer’s payo¤ function is always decreasing in
the di¤erence between p1 (default price if trading) and p0 (default price if not trading). Thus,
the …rst best is attained (when only the …rm’s investment decision matters) setting (p1 ¡ p0)
above the Max! v(!;¢) because in such a case the …rm becomes the only residual claimant of
its own investments.
9Figure 2.1: The Complete Game
decides its optimal level of investment,IS. Both parties realize the true state of
nature at period one. Moreover, the government learns the investment level (I)
done by the …rm. Later on, the renegotiation game takes place. Finally, the
dispute game might be the fourth stage, but we know that legal disputes are
irrelevant as long as courts cannot verify relevant variables to make a decision
(v;c;I). The irrelevance of disputes is represented in …gure 2.1 as each party
obtaining the same payo¤ on either going or not going into legal disputes.12
12We left the bidding process out of the game in order to avoid a more cumbersome model
(we focus on post-auction problems).
103. The Renegotiation Game
Let us solve the game backwards. Since we have assumed that courts are unable
to solve disputes, no party would pursue in a lawsuit in equilibrium (see the …rst
part of Hart and Moore’s proof to their Proposition 1). Then, we start solving
the subgame called renegotiation game in this section. In this subgame, the
government and the …rm bargain over a new contract to set the quality investment
level, q, to be carried out by the …rm before period 2.
At period 1, the true state of nature has already been realized and observed
by the parties. Moreover, the investment in infrastructure, I, is already sunk and
it is observed by the government. Since the original contract could not specify
contingent investment levels, I(!) and q(!), the resulting v(!;q) and c(!;I) could
not be speci…ed either. Therefore, how the ex-post surplus should be split between
the government and the …rm was not speci…ed in the original contract, leading
to a renegotiation game after date 1. Notice that this is a complete information
game because c is known by the parties and v is one-to-one mapping from [qL;qH]
to [vL;vH].
Ex-Post Surplus. Let us de…ne …rst the type of ex-post surplus we consider.
Given the realization of ! and investment I, the government and the …rm know
the level of the operational costs. Yet, they do not know how large v is, because
it depends on q, which will be invested by the …rm before period 2. Thus, for any
level of q, if the government accepts the project and there is no renegotiation, the
…rm will obtain ex-post pro…ts equal to Max fR¡c¡Á(q);0g; pro…ts will be zero
only if the …rm decides to abort the project. On the other hand, for any level of q,
if the …rm decides to continue and there is no renegotiation, the government will
obtain an ex-post surplus equal to Max fv(q)+R¡c¡Á(q);0g; this surplus will be
zero when the government decides to abort the project13. Therefore, government
and …rm have individual incentives to renegotiate q0, the speci…ed level of the
ex-post investment in quality originally contracted.
If the government wants to continue with the project, its ex-post optimal q
is ^ q, which is the unique solution to maximize fv(q) + R ¡ c ¡ Á(q)g subject to
q 2 [qL;qH]. Assumptions A.1 and A.3 ensure that ^ q belongs to the interior of
[qL;qH]. Whether or not q0 is smaller than this optimal level a¤ects the …nal
outcome of the game. On the other hand, it is clear the …rm prefers qL to any
13We are implicitly assuming both parties may abort the project and outsiders cannot see
what party is inducing this decision.
11other q if it continues with the project.
It is interesting to see what happens when no renegotiation takes place. The
project will continue if and only if [v(q0)+R¡c¡Á(q0) ¸ 0] and [R¡c¡Á(q0) ¸ 0].
Otherwise, either the government or the …rm would prefer to abort the project.
It is implicit in these inequalities the assumption that both parties individually
prefer to continue the project (rather than aborting it) when they are going to
obtain zero ex-post surplus.
The Bargaining Mechanism. Renegotiation in this context means that the
government and the …rm exchange a series of messages trying to convince the
other party to repudiate the old contract and write a new one. These messages
could be read by third parties but they would be a legally valid contract if and
only if the government and the …rm have signed it.14
Also, let us suppose that messages cannot be forged and that there is nothing
to stop the government (and the …rm, of course) agreeing at any time before
period 2 to tear-up the old contract and write a new one. It should be recognized
that this is a strong assumption when one party is the government, but it allows
the model to be workable.
Finally, let us describe the message technology used in the revision of q. Time
between 1 and 2 can be divided into subperiods (say, days). Messages will be
exchanged until day D, where D still belongs to period 1 (so q will be invested
before 2). A message is a letter containing the signature of the sender and it is
sent by a reliable “mail” taking 1 day to arrive. Each party does one collection
and one delivery a day. A message delivery the previous day arrives before the
collection of the day. Both parties can send several messages in the same day.
Messages sent on day D arrive before parties decide either to invest q or to stop
the project.
Two useful de…nitions that we use in the next proposition are ¹ q and ~ q. Let
¹ q be the minimum q such that the …rm gets zero ex-post payo¤s; i.e. ¹ q solves
[R ¡c ¡ Á(q) = 0]. Let ~ q the minimum q such that government gets zero ex-post
surplus; i.e. ~ q is the minimum q solving [v(~ q) + R ¡c ¡Á(~ q) = 0].
14An alternative stronger assumption is to assume that it is impossible to publicly record a
message sent by one party (Hart and Moore’s outcome crucially depends on it). Our weaker
assumption is enough to analyze the game played in countries with Judiciary System based on
Napoleonic Codes, where any contract is valid if and only if it has been signed by both parties
(e.g. France, Spain, and some Latin American countries). The stronger assumption is necessary
to analyze the game in countries with Judiciary System based on Common Law (USA or Britain,
for example).
12Proposition 3.1. Consider the model speci…ed in section 2 and suppose assump-
tions 1 to 4 hold. Let q be the only variable that both parties can credibly renego-
tiate. Let q0 be the investment in quality speci…ed by the date-zero contract which
will apply if no messages are sent between period 1 and day D. Then, conditional
on IS, q0 and the realization of !, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
outcome of the renegotiation game, qS, can take only …ve possible values:
i) qS = q0 if ^ q ¸ q0 and both parties are better o¤ keeping the time zero
contract than stopping the project;
ii) qS = ^ q if ^ q < q0, both parties get a non-negative ex-post surplus at ^ q, and
no party has all the ex-post power;
iii) qS = ¹ q if the …rm is willing to continue with the project at qL but not at
either q0 or ^ q; and the government obtains a non-negative ex-post surplus at ¹ q;
iv) qS = ~ q if the government is willing to continue with the project at either
q0 or ^ q but not at qL; and the …rm obtains a non-negative ex-post surplus at ~ q;
v) qS = 0 if either some party is not willing to continue the project at any
q ¸ qL or when one party is willing to continue the project at some q ¸ qL, the
other party prefers to abort.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 1. This proposition highlights the importance of the relative ex-post
power in allocating property rights over the residual asset of the partnership, the
ex-post surplus.
The …rst case, qS = q0, arises when the parties’ ex-post surplus (the outcome
of the renegotiation game) run in opposite directions –what is better for the …rm
(to reduce q) is worse for the government, and viceversa– and both parties would
continue the project as speci…ed by the time-zero contract (see …gure 3.1, below)15.
The government would accept a new contract if and only if it speci…es a higher
investment in quality, but such a contract will never be accepted by the …rm.
Moreover, since the …rm is willing to continue with the partnership at q0, the
government never sends a message asking for replacement of the existing contract
15Figure 2 illustrates the government and the …rm’s ex-post surplus as a function of the
investment in quality. Notice that these surpluses are never negative, because both parties have
the alternative to abort the project before undertaken q. Therefore, the vertical axis above zero
corresponds to the government’s ex-post surplus (v(q) + R ¡c ¡ Á(q)); and the vertical axis
below zero corresponds to the …rm’s ex-post pro…t (R ¡c ¡Á(q)). Finally, the horizontal axis
corresponds to quality investment, q.
13Figure 3.1: Case i) No Renegotiation Takes Place
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for a new one specifying a lower level of investment in quality. The same argument
implies that the …rm never tries to reduce the contracted quality investment level.
In other words, no party has enough power to change the time zero contract.
In the second case both parties have equal ex-post power, i.e. either both want
to continue with the project or both want to stop it. Nonetheless, both parties
are ex-post better-o¤ by reducing the investment in quality, so a new contract
tiers-up the previous one and …xes q at ^ q (see in …gure 3.2 the case where both
parties want to continue at q0). Notice that the government will not sign any
contract specifying any q < ^ q because it knows that the …rm will accept a take-it-
or-leave-it contract specifying ^ q in the last day. Any threat by the …rm regarding
not signing such a contract is not credible because the …rm is better-o¤ at ^ q than
at q0.
Case iii) is more interesting. Here the government has all the ex-post power.
So, the outcome of the renegotiation game tells us that the government gets all
the ex-post surplus. The …rm might send a large amount of messages asking for a
new contract with q < ¹ q, but the government would always reject them because it
knows that in the last day the …rm will accept a take-it-or-leave-it message asking
14Figure 3.2: Case ii) Renegotiation Makes Both Parties Better-o¤








for q = ¹ q (it should be remember that any party prefers to continue when payo¤s
in such a situation are the same as those when stopping the project). Threat from
the …rm saying that if the government does not sign a contract asking for some
q < ¹ q, the …rm will reject the …nal o¤er from the government is not credible (see
…gure 3.3, below).
In case iv) the …rm obtains all the ex-post surplus because it has all the ex-post
power. That is because the government wants to tier-up the time zero contract
and the …rm is better-o¤ keeping it more than tiering-up (see …gure 3.4, below).
We are implicitly assuming that the net consumer surplus may be negative for
some states of nature. No important result of this paper changes ruling out this
case.
It is clear that the project is aborted when both parties are better o¤ …nishing
the relationship than continuing it at any quality investment level (case v)). The
same outcome obtains, however, when at least one party is willing to continue
the project at some q ¸ qL but it is unable to compensate (in terms of giving up
some of its ex-post surplus) the other party to continue with the project. Figure
3.5 shows the case when both government and …rm want to continue the project
15Figure 3.3: Case iii) The Government has all the Ex-post Power









Figure 3.4: Case iv) The Firm has all the Ex-post Power






16Figure 3.5: Case v) The Project is Aborted







at some q, but in such levels the other party prefers to abort the project.
These results deserve at least one comment. If the time zero contract cannot be
renegotiated, only under very strong conditions the project would not be aborted.
Such a remark might lead to a wrong conclusion: it is better to allow the parties to
renegotiate the contract after sunk investments have been undertaken, because it
makes the continuation of the project more likely; moreover, renegotiation allows
the achievement of an optimal quality investment level once I is known (ex-post
e¢cient outcome). Such a conclusion is false, however, because the possibility
of renegotiation may induce strategic behavior that in turn would lead to either
under or over-investment in the …rst stage, as we will see later. When making the
investment decision, the …rm is a¤ecting not only its expected ex-post gains but
also the government’s. This externality most likely impedes the …rst best from
being attained (ex-ante ine¢cient outcome).
174. The Firm and the Government’s Decisions
In this section we solve backward the sequential decisions by the government and
the …rm in, respectively, choosing the investment in quality to be contracted at
time zero, qS
0, and the investment in infrastructure to be carried out before period
1, IS. Since the true state of nature is unknown in these stages, both parties make
their decisions maximizing expected payo¤s.
4.1. Over and Under-Investment Outcome
Assuming that the probability distributions of v and c satisfy the spanning con-
dition described below, the next proposition shows that there exists a unique
solution to the …rm’s problem (IS, say). The proposition also tells us that IS is
not necessarily below the Pareto optimal level, as expected in a symmetric but
unveri…able information model.





(1) For each a 2 A (a non-empty, compact set of actions available to one
player),
pk(a) = ¸(a) ¢ p
0
k + [1 ¡ ¸(a)] ¢ p
00





k is increasing in k, where k = 1;2;:::;K < 1
This condition is an adaptation of that in Grossman and Hart (1983). The
…rst part of the spanning condition ensures that the e¤ect of increasing I in the
probability of obtaining a lower cost is independent of the level of I. Similarly,
(1) ensures that the e¤ect of increasing q in the probability of obtaining a higher
consumer surplus is independent of the of q. The second part of the condition is
the (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property, which is a mild assumption. The
strict monotone likelihood ratio property implies the higher I, the more likely to
obtain a lower cost of operation. Similarly, (2) implies the higher q, the more
likely to obtain a higher consumer surplus.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that conditions of Proposition 3.1 are satis…ed. More-
over, suppose for each I 2 (0;1) and q 2 (0;1) the following conditions hold:
18i) for all I and q, the random variables v(¢;q) and c(¢;I) are statistically
independent;
ii) the (non-degenerate) support of c(¢;I) is: fcH = c1 > ::: > cj > ::: > cJ =
cLg, where J > 1;
iii) the probability of cj, fj(I), satis…es the spanning condition;
iv) the (non-degenerate) support of v(¢;q) is fvL = v1 < ::: < vi < ::: < vN =
vHg, where N > 1;
v) the probability of vi, hi(q), satis…es the spanning condition.
Then, there is a unique investment level, IS, consistent with the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame that begins in the …rm’s decision node
of the complete game (see …gure 2.1, above). Moreover, IS need not coincide with
I¤.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2. The Time Zero Contract
Since the government knows the …rm’s best response strategy, the government
behaves strategically when choosing the investment in quality, qS
0, to be contracted
at period zero. The government’s objective function matches the omnipotent
planner’s one. Nevertheless, two di¤erences may prevent the achievement of the
…rst best. One is the fact that here the government takes IS as given; and if
IS 6= I¤, then qS
0 6= q¤. The second di¤erence is that in the complete information
case q¤ cannot be revised, whereas here qS
0 may be revised after IS is sunk.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that conditions of Proposition 4.1 hold. Then there is
a unique qS
0 consistent with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the subgame
that begins in the government’s decision node of the complete game (see …gure
2.1, above). Moreover, qS
0 need not coincide with q¤.
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 2. Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 dramatically change the main result found
in the literature of incomplete contracts with symmetric but unveri…able infor-
mation. The possibility of revising the original contract allows us to …nd under-
investment and over-investment as feasible outcomes of the game.
19The …rst best investment level can rarely be achieved because of externalities
in the …rm’s decision. Changing I away from I¤ reduces both the …rm and the
government’s ex-post surplus, at any q, because it increases expected operational
costs. Therefore, for some parametrization it may be valuable to the …rm to invest
above or below the …rst best level. This decision may help or hurt the government,
but this externality is not considered by the …rm.
First of all, consistent with Hart and Moore’s paper, it may be worthy to the
…rmto reduce initial investments below I¤. The …rmhasincentivesto under-invest
when the bene…t of reducing investment in infrastructure (Á(I¤)¡Á(I0); for some
I0 < I¤) is greater than the sum of expected costs in terms of higher operational
costs (E(c=I0) ¡ E(c=I¤)) and monetary cost in terms of higher investment in
quality of the service (when relevant). This is not the case, however, when either
no renegotiation takesplace –becausein such situation the government sets q0 = q¤
and, therefore, the …rm invests I¤– or when the original contract is revised, qS =
f¹ q;0g in equilibrium16. However, under-investment is feasible for any expected
situation where this decision is pro…table and ex-post renegotiation takes place.
This is because both the …rm and the government know that the contracted q
will change after revised. Therefore, under-investment occurs only if it implies
qS = f^ q; ~ qg.
Let us provide an example of under-investment. Assume that the …rm under-
invests because it expects to drive the government to its reservation utility; i.e.
with this decision the government is ex-post in a situation of non-voluntary trade
at q0 (see …gure 4.1, below). Then, if the di¤erence Á(I¤)¡Á(I0); for some I0 < I¤
is greater than [E(c=I0) ¡ E(c=I¤)] + [Á(~ q) ¡ Á(q0)], then the …rm has incentives
to invest less than the …rst best.
This example illustrates the fact that under-investment is more likely to occur
when the …rm expects ending up in a situation where it obtains all the ex-post
power. Thus, shrinking the ex-post pie (summation of ex-post surpluses) is worthy
to the …rm because it is compensated by obtaining 100% of the shrunk pie.
Regarding over-investment, it is a direct consequence of the possibility to revise
the investment plan. Like under-investment, the …rm optimally invests when
either no renegotiation is expected or the …rm’s surplus after renegotiation is
equal to zero. Therefore, the …rm may over-invest for any ex-post qS = f^ q; ~ qg.
16It is possible to show that it is not an equilibrium strategy to the …rm to under-invest when
this decision decreases the ex-post investment in quality. This is because the only feasible cases
are to end-up at either q = 0 or q = q. At those levels, the …rm obtains zero ex-post gain.
20Figure 4.1: Underinvestment
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21Let us illustrate the over-investment outcome with an example. Suppose the
parties expects an ex-post situation of b q < q¤. Then, setting q0 = q¤ does not
change the fact that qS = ^ q. Whenever the …rm increases I, not only the same ex-
post situation will prevail but also both parties will see a higher ex-post surplus
when reducing q to b q. Hence, if the …rm’s bene…t of over-investing (E(c=I¤) ¡
E(c=I0); for some I0 > I¤) is greater than the monetary cost of increasing I above
the optimal level (Á(I0) ¡ Á(I¤)), then the …rm is better o¤ over-investing (see
…gure 4.2).
This example shows that over-investment is likely to occur when the …rm
expects to end up in a situation where both parties are willing to reduce the
contracted q. Thus, increasing the pie pays more to the …rm in such a situation.
It is important to mention that if we only restrict our attention to non-negative
net consumer surpluses (~ q is ruled out as an equilibrium of the renegotiation
game), then the only reason to obtain ex-ante ine¢ciencies in public infrastructure
franchising is because both parties expects to share the ex-post surplus after
revising the original contract. This result is only feasible because the variable
to be revised, q, attains a maximum in the interior of [qL;qH]. Therefore, it is
consistent with the main conclusion by Bös and Lülfesmann (1996). That is,
a benevolent government and a …rm always attain the …rst best when revising
prices.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a model which, departing from Hart and Moore’s seminal
paper, is capable of dealing with the dynamics of contracts and renegotiation in
public infrastructure franchising. One of the main characteristics of this model
is that it considers a benevolent government as one of the parties, so the gov-
ernment incorporates the surplus of both consumers and the …rm in its objective
function. This allows for a better analysis exclusively concentrated on the e¢-
ciency consequences of incorporating private capital in the infrastructure sector.
The second characteristic is that the variable to be revised during renegotiations
is the contracted investment plan (investment in quality), so the ex-post surplus
of the government attains a maximum in the interior of its feasible set.
The main contribution of this paper to the literature in incomplete contracting
with symmetric but unveri…able information is the possibility of over-investment
in public infrastructure franchising; i.e. “white elephants” are therefore not only
consequence of public production but also they may arise under private provision
22Figure 4.2: Overinvestment
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23of public infrastructure. In other words, over-investment may arise in equilibrium
even though we assume a rational and benevolent government. Furthermore, as
expected, this paper also shows the feasibility of the hold-up e¤ect in this game.
From the public policy perspective, this paper highlights the importance of
strengthening regulatory and judiciary institutions in order to avoid both exces-
sive ambiguities in infrastructure franchising and opportunistic behavior by the
parties. The more ambiguities in contracts and the worse prepared judiciary and
regulatory institutions in the country, the more likely to end up with either the
hold-up problem or “white elephants” in infrastructure (i.e. ex-ante ine¢ciency).
Other interesting conclusions in this paper are:
² In the case of renegotiation, the ex-post surplus might be shared by the two
parties. Such a case may happen when the ex-post optimal investment in
quality for the government is above the original contracted level and both
parties are willing to continue the project at the time zero contract. Fur-
thermore, in the case of renegotiation when the individual objective function
of each party are inversely related, the ex-post surplus is fully obtained by
the party which has more power in the renegotiation game.
² Disputes are not a subgame perfect outcome because of non-veri…ability of
the initial investment, I.
² The government has total freedom to choose its optimal contract at time
zero, i.e. the contracted investment in quality is some q0 belonging to the
interval [qL;qH]. The reason is because investment in quality is not directly
related with the individual participation constraint of the …rm.
² The …rst best investment levels (I¤;q¤) cannot be achieved even when only
the …rm’s investment matters.
The model may also be used to explain why non-legal disputes might arise
in equilibrium, such as political scandals, mutual allegations of corruption and
ine¢ciencies, public pressures from each party in order to induce a more favorable
outcome for itself before completing investments, etc. In spite of being of main
importance in developing countries, these more political economy applications of
the model are not assessed in this paper, however. We leave them for future
research.
24This paper has shortcomings. First of all, further research must characterize
the equilibria of this incomplete contracting situation. Some non-disjoint alterna-
tives are, for instance, to assume speci…c probability distributions on v an c or to
restrict the set - to a few states of nature.
Regarding the model, it is not fully realistic. Like Hart and Moore’s, our
paper implicitly assumes that the government is unable to write more sophisti-
cated contracts. Is the government behaving strategically when not designing the
renegotiation procedure in the original contract?. An interesting line of research
would be to …nd justi…cations to our assumption, rather than just assuming the
existence of transactions costs at time zero. It is also interesting to know whether
our conclusions are robust to introduce endogenous renegotiation in the model.17
Another point is the assumption that courts are only able to distinguish
whether transaction takes place. But, why are courts unable to observe deliv-
eries or intentions of trading?. Why courts cannot randomize?. In this paper we
have just assumed that, in developing countries, courts cannot observe more than
those in Hart and Moore’s paper. Further research ought to assess this point.
Finally, it may be interesting toabandon the benevolent government paradigm.
The self-interested paradigm seems to be an adequate assumption to capture the
economic problems arising when the government behaves strategically, as it is the
case in this paper.18
Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proposition 3.1
Thanks to the message technology originally proposed by Hart and Moore
(1988) –that we are using herein with little changes– there are no legal disputes in
stage four. This implies that the renegotiation step can be analyzed as a normal
form game (see Hart and Moore, pp. 777).
17Actually, in a very recent paper, Maskin and Tirole (1997) show that the …rst best may
be attained with more sophisticated contracts. They use the same main assumptions of the in-
complete contract literature (transaction costs and the possibility that players perform dynamic
programming). It turns out that research in theoretical contract theory should strongly work in
explaining why agents (including government) prefer simple contracts when complex contracts
are at their disposal.
18A survey of reasons arguing that claim is Tirole (1994). See further references on this paper.
25Case i), qS = q0 if ^ q ¸ q0 and both parties are better o¤ keeping the
time zero contract than stopping the project. Suppose there are at least
one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome which implies quality investment
equal to qSPE 6= q0. Since ^ q ¸ q0, the government (…rm) prefers some q above
(below) q0, then changingthe quality investment speci…ed in thetimezerocontract
necessarily hurts one of the parties. Assume, without lost of generality, that the
government is worse o¤ (i.e. v(qSPE)¡Á(qSPE) < v(q0)¡Á(q0) ). Let us show that
government has incentives to unilaterally deviates, so qSPE cannot be a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium. Consider the following strategy for the government: do
not send any message before than day D. Suppose that the …rm sends messages
every day since v and c were known asking for tearing up the old contract and
o¤ering qSPE (notice we are analyzing government’s deviation from qSPE, not
…rm’s deviation from it). At day D the government sends a message to the …rm
proposing to tier up all the messages sent by the …rm. Later on, the government’s
strategy is to accept the investment in quality done by the …rm and neither to
sign nor to reveal any message received from the …rm in the case of disputes. If
the …rm is willing to trade, then q = q0 because any other level would only arise in
an eventual dispute (q is veri…able), where the government would sign and reveal
some of the messages sent by the …rm (q = qSPE), and the …rm would not sign the
unique message sent by the government. But, this is not an equilibrium strategy
because the government is better o¤ not signing any message. By the same token,
if the …rm wants to abort the project, then q = 0. But, again this is not an
equilibrium strategy because …rm’s payo¤ continuing with the project are greater
than aborting it (R ¡ c ¡ Á(q0) > 0). Therefore, it is worthy for the government
to deviate from qSPE to q0, a contradiction.
Case ii), qS = ^ q if ^ q < q0, both parties get a non-negative ex-post surplus
at ^ q, and none party has all the ex-post power. Unlike cases where ^ q ¸
q0, when ^ q < q0 both parties have incentives to reduce the quality investment
level. The …rm prefers to reduce q to qL and the government only from q to ^ q .
Thus, any strategy involving q > ^ q cannot be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
because it is strictly dominated by ^ q for the two players. The same apply for any
q < ^ q because they are strictly dominated by ^ q for the government. To prove
it, consider there exist at least one subgame perfect equilibrium evolving qSPE
6= ^ q . The government deviates from qSPE to ^ q using the following strategy: at
day D the government sends its unique message to the …rm proposing to tier up
both the old time zero contract and all the messages sent by the …rm, and to …x
26a new quality investment level equal to ^ q . Later on, the government accepts the
investment in quality done by the …rm and do not sign any message received from
the …rm (if any) to be revealed in the case of disputes. The …rm has two choices. If
it decides to invest, then q = ^ q because any other q is not a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, otherwise either government or …rm would play strictly dominated
strategies in the dispute stage as well as we saw in case i). By the same token,
the …rm is not going to abort the project because its payo¤ are greater investing
^ q than nothing. Therefore, the government has incentives to unilaterally deviates
from qSPE to ^ q , which is a contradiction.
Case iii), qS = ¹ q if the …rm is willing to continue with the project at qL
but not at either q0 or ^ q; and the government obtains a non-negative
ex-post surplus at ¹ q. Suppose there is at least one subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium outcome which entails quality investment equal to qSPE 6= ¹ q , where
¹ q = Á
¡1(R¡c) 2 [qL;qH] by A.3 (i.e. the …rm gets zero ex-post surplus). First of
all, qSPE > ¹ q is not feasible because the …rm has unilateral incentives to deviates
in order to not lose money following this strategy: do not send any message during
1 and D, do not sign –and do not reveal to a court in the case of disputes– any of
the messages received by the government, and abort the project (q = 0). Hence, if
qSPE 6= ¹ q then the government must be worse o¤ with qSPE than with q = ¹ q. That
is false because the government is better o¤ at ¹ q using the following strategy: at
day D it sends its unique message to the …rm proposing to tier-up both the old
time zero contract and all the messages sent by the …rm, and to …x a new quality
investment level equal to ¹ q. Later on, the government accepts the investment in
quality done by the …rm and do not sign any message received from the …rm to
be revealed in the case of disputes. The …rm has two choices. If it decides to
invest, then q = ¹ q because any other q is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
otherwise either government or …rm would play strictly dominated strategies as
well as we saw in case i). Therefore, since at ¹ q the government obtains a non-
negative ex-post surplus, it has incentives to unilaterally deviates from qSPE to ¹ q
, which is a contradiction.
Case iv), qS = ~ q if the government is willing to continue with the project
at either q0 or ^ q but not at qL; and the …rm obtains a non-negative ex-
post surplus at ~ q. The proof here is symmetric to Case iii) except that now the
…rm has all the power in the revision game because only the government wants to
abort the project at q0. Hence, the …rm o¤ers the government’s reservation quality
27investment, i.e. q = ~ q which is the unique q solving v(q) + R ¡ c ¡ Á(q) = 0.
Case v), qS = 0 if either some party is not willing to continue the
project at any q ¸ qL or when one party is willing to continue the
project at some q ¸ qL the other party is better o¤ aborting the project
at that level. If some party is worse o¤ at any q ¸ qL, then aborting the project
(q = 0) is the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the renegotiation
game (any q ¸ qL is strictly dominated by q = 0). Suppose, without loss of
generality, that the …rm wants to abort the project at any q ¸ qL. Regardless
what q 2 [qL;qH] the government o¤ers to the …rm in a new contract, the …rm is
worse o¤ accepting the o¤er than aborting the project. Thus, the only subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is no messages are sent by any party, the …rm
doesn’t invest at all, i.e. abort the project (q = 0), and there are no disputes at
the end. The non-veri…ability of v, c and I impedes the government to go on legal
disputes using the time zero contract. Finally, let us suppose that both parties
would continue the partnership at some q ¸ qL but both fv(¹ q) + R ¡ c ¡ Á(¹ q)g
and fR ¡ c ¡ Á(~ q)g are negative at that level; i.e. none party has power to
bargain because each one is worse o¤ o¤ering to the other party’s reservation q
than stopping the project. Therefore, after deleting strictly dominated strategies
the only strategy that remains is to stop the project.
This completes the proof
Proposition 4.1
Step 1 : De…nitions
Let us re-scale the investment such that I 2 (0;1). Let Ia be the actual value
of the investment, then de…ne I =
Ia¡IL
IH¡IL. The same can be done to re-scale q.
Let rename qS as qS
ij to highlight that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
outcome in the renegotiation stage depends on the true state of nature, i.e. qS
ij =
fq0; ^ q; ~ q; ¹ q;0g.
Voluntary trade occurs if and only if [vi + R ¡ cj ¡ Á(qS





j be the spanning probability distributions over the support of
c(¢;I). Since fj(I) satis…es the spanning condition then fj(I) = Ip0











j by de…nition of fj(I), so it does not depend on I.
De…ne ¢fj =
@fj(I)
@I . Likewise, de…ne ¢hi =
@hi(q)
@q , which does not depend
on q.
28De…ne monotonicity by the property qS
i;j+i ¸ qS
ij ¸ qS









Step 2 : First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD)
Let us show that spanning condition (SC) implies FOSD. Since fj increasing


































Step 3 : Existence and Uniqueness of IS (given qS
ij)




fj(I)hi(q)[vi + R ¡ cj ¡ Á(q)] ¡ Á(I)
o
By assumptions A.1 to A.3 this objective function is strictly concave, then


































j as j changes to j + 1. On the other hand, the

















00 > 0, this objective function is strictly concave, then FOC is necessary


















Since BI is bounded (by A.1 and A.2), continuous and strictly increasing in
I (by de…nitions of fj(I), Á(I) and FOSD), and non-negative (voluntary trade);
and Á(I) satis…es Inada conditions (A.3), then by the intermediate value theorem
there exists a unique IS 2 [IL;IH] solving BI(IS;qS
ij) = Á
0(IS)
Step 4 : Second Best Investment Decision (IS)
Two things are important establishing the second best. One is to know how AI
changes as q changes. The other one is to know the di¤erence between AI(I¤;q¤)
and BI(IS;qS
ij). Let AIq ´
@[AI]
@q . From the complete information’s FOC we have:
AIq =
X







because both terms are positive and their magnitude cannot be a priori inferred.
Therefore, under and over-investment are likely to occur no matter the level
of q0. Remember q0 is determined by the government in a previous stage, so q0
and qS
ij are known by the …rm before deciding IS.
To prove the second part of Proposition 2 is enough to show one feasible
example for each alternative. Therefore, the required conditions for each case are
su¢cient but not necessary.
(a) under-investment. Assume q0 · q¤. A su¢cient condition for under-
investment is AIq > 0.







Proposition 1 each qS
ij · q0.
From Planner’s FOC: Á
0(I¤) = AI(I¤;q¤)
but AIq > 0 implies > AI(I¤;qS
ij)




by …rm’s FOC: = Á
0(IS)
Since Á
00 > 0, then IS < I¤:





¢fjhi(q¤)Á(q¤), AIq < 0. Same proof as above.
This completes the proof
Proposition 4.2
Step 1 : De…nitions and FOSD
It is possible to re-scale q such that it belongs to (0;1). De…nitions of voluntary
trade and monotonicity remain the same.
De…ne ¢hi =
@hi(q)
@q , which does not depend on q by the de…nition of hi. ¢hi is
(strictly) increasing in i by the (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property. Hence,
¢hi satis…ed FOSD.
Step 2 : Existence and Uniqueness of qS
0 (given IS and qS
ij)
From FOC of the complete contracting case we have:
X
fj(I























00 > 0, this objective function is strictly concave, then FOC is necessary
and su¢cient for a maximum.20
FOC:
P









20To clarify concepts only, remember that qS
ij(q0) is a (KJx1) vector taking only …ve possible
values, i.e. fqS
11;:::qS
KJg = fq0;:::;q0; ^ q;:::^ q; ~ q;:::~ q; ¹ q;:::¹ q;0;:::0g. Then, changing q0 will only di-
rectly a¤ect those qS
ij where q0 will be the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the renegotiation
















where Dq is the …rst term on FOC.
Since both terms are bounded (by assumptions A.1 to A.3), continuous and
strictly increasing in q (by de…nitions of hi(q), Á(q) and FOSD), and non-negative
(voluntary trade); and Á(q) satis…es Inada conditions (by assumption A.3), then
by the intermediate value theorem there exists a unique q0 2 [qL;qH] solving this
problem.
Step 3 : The Second Best Time Zero Contract
Any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the …rst and the second best has to
be respectively consistent with:












Similarly to proof of Proposition 2, the sign of some feasible inequalities are
the main importance to identify su¢cient (but not necessary) conditions to either
qS




























0 ¸ q¤ or qS






fj(IS)¢hiÁ(q¤) is feasible even though qS
0 ¸ q¤ because by Proposition 1
qS
ij · qS
0 (it is always true for qS















Proof : Aq(IS;q¤) < Aq(I¤;q¤) by IS < I¤ and FOSD.
by (#): = Á
0(q¤)









from (##): = Dq(IS;qS
ij)










0; the previous inequality holds even though qS
0 ¸ q¤.
Therefore, qS
0 R q¤ is feasible for any IS < I¤.
(b) qS
















0(q¤). The proof is similar to above.
Therefore, qS
0 need not coincide with q¤.
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